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POSITION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
ON THE BERLIN SITUATION

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The position of the Government of the Federal Republic on the current Berlin crisis, which erupted in 1958 with Khrushchev's November 10 speech, is to oppose any changes in the status quo which reduce German security and/or dim still more the currently small hopes for the reunification of Germany. The Soviet proposal for a "free city" and a peace treaty are completely unacceptable.

This position is consistent with the desires of the majority of the German people and the Federal Government's basic, long-term objectives (reunification by peaceful means and integration of all of Germany in a Western European political, military, and economic system). The position also conforms with the principles governing Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's foreign policies (equality of treatment for the Federal Republic; priority to security over reunification at this stage; and the stand that only the Federal Government, although itself a temporary association, is authorized to speak for the German people pending reunification and a final peace settlement).

However, there are external factors which limit German capabilities to initiate courses of action in support of their position on the crisis. German security is dependent upon the Western Allies, especially the US. Most Eastern and Western European States would not object to prolonging the current divided status of Germany, neither advocating measures to advance the cause of reunification nor denying the Germans the hope of eventual reunification. This considerably reduces the chances for a solution of the Berlin crisis in the framework of a solution of the larger German problem. Moreover, the legal responsibility for Berlin and Germany as a whole has been reserved as the responsibility of the three Western Powers and the USSR. Consequently,

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of proposals which appear different from the Geneva package of 1955. Rather it has sought to restrain its Allies, especially the UK, to turn possible offers of concessions away from the security field; and recently to backtrack even on a hint of qualified willingness to acquiesce in de facto recognition of the GDR in order to preserve the Allied position in Berlin. It is unlikely that Chancellor Adenauer's dominant influence on determination of German foreign policy decisions will be reduced in the crucial period of inter-Allied and East-West negotiations ahead. (This takes into account the Chancellor's decision to accept the candidacy for President). Adenauer advocates no concessions without counter concessions and is reluctant to permit the development of any Western tactical position likely to lead to serious negotiations on matters inimical to the security interests of the Federal Republic. *

I. ESSENTIALS OF THE POSITION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

The Government of the Federal Republic is committed to a policy which aims at the reunification of all of Germany by peaceful and democratic means and at the progressive attachment of Germany to an integrated Europe. It has sought military security and political support by aligning itself with NATO and the United States. It considers the Federal Republic a temporary federation pending achievement of reunification of all of Germany. It holds the US, UK, France and the USSR responsible for all-German questions and for Berlin. There are two reasons. These Powers assumed full control of Germany in 1945 following the defeat of the Third Reich. A final peace settlement has not been negotiated with an all-German government selected by the German people and responsive to them.

The Federal Government recognizes that the continued division of Germany is a consequence of the larger East-West struggle. Therefore, it has urged the Western Powers and the USSR to seek political détente, disarmament and other agreements which will produce an atmosphere conducive to eventual solution of reunification. However, it has consistently refused to sacrifice the security of the Federal Republic, to make concessions which are not clearly linked to a guaranteed plan for reunification, or to recognize the German Democratic Republic. It asserts that it is the only authorized spokesman for the German people now.

The Federal Government has rejected the Soviet proposals made in Soviet notes of November 27, 1958, and January 10, 1959, namely: that the quadripartite status in Berlin is null and void; that West Berlin should be made a "free city"; that a peace treaty should be signed which isolates and neutralizes West Germany; and that the "two existing German states" can

Related Intelligence Reports Nos. 7994, April 7, 1959, and 7996, April 9, 1959, discuss the positions of France and the UK.

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only come together in a confederal arrangement which assures the permanent existence of the East German regime, thus perpetuating the division of Germany.

In the development of the substance of Western responses to the Soviet challenge, the Federal Government has adhered closely to the Western package proposal made at the Geneva Conference in 1955. On specific issues, it has made the following points:

1. Berlin and Access to Berlin.

The Berlin problem can only be solved in the context of the reunification of Germany and a wider European security arrangement. The Western Powers should not accept GDR controls over access to the city or grant de facto recognition to the East German regime to assure access. The "agent" theory is dangerous and illogical since the USSR alone can designate the GDR an "agent." The presence of Allied garrisons in Berlin is indispensable to the safety and well-being of the city. The United Nations should not replace the Western Allies in the city since the effectiveness of the UN would depend upon a fluctuating majority in the General Assembly and since this would jeopardize reunification legally and politically.

2. Reunification.

The reunification of Germany should proceed on a step by step basis over a period of several years. It should be tied to the simultaneous development of a European security system. Representatives from East and West Germany can make suggestions for functional contacts and develop electoral proposals provided they are clearly operating under Four Power auspices and their decisions are subject to Four Power approval. The composition and responsibilities of the representatives have to be examined with extreme care because of their potential effect on the future development of Germany. Free elections may come at the end of the reunification process. Elections are ultimately indispensable.

3. Security and Disengagement.

The Federal Government can offer no counter proposals on security. This is a matter affecting other nations. The Federal Republic of Germany is dependent upon the Western Powers for security. The Federal Republic of Germany must be treated equally with other states in the development and armament of its forces. Disengagement, thinning of forces, a "freeze" on forces and armament in a zone encompassing Germany, or a specific limitation on West German forces would be unacceptable to the Federal Government, particularly if these were presented by the West to the USSR as negotiable subjects and if there were no commensurate political concessions by the USSR.

4. Peace Treaty.

The final peace settlement must be negotiated with a united Germany. It must leave her free to determine her own foreign policy, foreign association and domestic order. Her military status should be set in a European security framework, preferably preceded by a general disarmament agreement. The borders should be those of Germany in 1937, but if this is unobtainable, the Oder-Neisse line can be accepted temporarily with a German guarantee that it will not be revised by force. In February, Foreign Minister von Brentano said West Germany could consider offering to recognize the Oder-Neisse line for tactical purposes if the USSR and Poland should demand proof that Germany is no threat to them. This device has become more circumscribed, however, by General de Gaulle's statement that he supports recognition of the Oder-Neisse line and subsequent German reaction against this statement.

In the procedural questions and the development of a Western position, the Federal Government has shown more flexibility than on substantive matters. Initially, Chancellor Adenauer strongly urged refusal to meet with the USSR as long as the Soviets maintained the six months deadline for agreement on Berlin. He opposed negotiation at pistol point. The pressure of the UK and the modification of the Soviet "ultimatum" have brought him to reluctant acceptance of a Summit Conference. The role of "advisors" is acceptable to the Germans at a Foreign Ministers or a Summit Conference. There are no scheduled German elections which would seriously affect the prospective timing of conferences. Chancellor Adenauer will probably be elected President of the Federal Republic on July 1, but he will remain as Chancellor until September 15 and the expiration of the term of President Theodor Heuss.

The character of the tactics employed by the Federal Government since November has been moderate with the Western Allies and geared to a prolonged struggle with the USSR. In the Allied camp, the principal effort has been directed at the British. Chancellor Adenauer has endeavored to reduce the impact of Mr. Macmillan's "flexibility" on both the reunification and security issues. Illustrative of his concern at ostensible British "softness," Chancellor Adenauer has personally conferred twice since November with General de Gaulle to assure the latter's firmness on access questions and "disengagement." Both meetings were just prior to UK-French talks. He has also attempted to get UK concurrence for a five year stand-still agreement on all subjects including reunification. Unsuccessful in this move, the Chancellor appeared to be considering a move in mid-March to separate the security and recognition problems, by assigning priority to negotiable subjects. Clearly, he would not want any negotiations on security per se. There may be some acceptable method of dealing with the GDR regime which is tantamount to de facto recognition but preserves hopes for reunification. However, by the end of March he had backed away from this move apparently because he believes any recognition of the GDR would undercut reunification.

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Evidence that the Federal Republic of Germany expects a prolonged struggle is shown by the major German efforts to inform and win over uncommitted nations. Mayor Willy Brandt of Berlin was sent on a round-the-world trip in January and February, for example.

II. ELEMENTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERMAN POSITION

A. German view of Soviet objectives and purposes

Without assigning a priority, the Federal Government considers Soviet objectives in the Berlin and German crisis to be the following:

1. Cutting of the Federal Republic's Western economic ties, especially the European integration projects. The purpose is to get the German economic capacity for the USSR itself, thus adding to the Soviet world economic potential for a show-down struggle with the USA.
2. Politico-military isolation and neutralization of the Federal Republic. This to be achieved by pulling the West German state out of NATO, reducing or sharply limiting German forces and weapons and by demanding the withdrawal of US forces from Germany. The latter would mean US withdrawal from Europe since it would be difficult to place US forces elsewhere on the continent and since the political reasons for their presence would be diminished.
3. Forcing the Allies to abandon West Berlin. This would lead to conditions favorable for subverting democratic institutions in West Berlin.
4. Strengthening the Soviet and Communist position in East Germany. The Communists want to undercut the resistance and oppositional sentiments of the East German people and force them to accommodate to the GDR regime as a permanent, stable state. This to be obtained by increasing the prestige of the GDR; by increasing its international status through de facto and, eventually, de jure recognition by Western nations, particularly the 4 Western powers; and by demonstrating that Berlin is at the mercy of the USSR and GDR.
5. Reducing manpower losses and inefficiency caused by the refugee flow. One quarter million persons leave the GDR annually. Losses are felt especially in the military age and intellectual-technician brackets.
6. Eliminating Berlin as a source of freedom and a symbol of hope to persons in the GDR and other Soviet satellites, especially Poland and to a lesser extent in Czechoslovakia. This to be done by dealing the Allies a severe prestige and political blow which would accrue from the loss of Berlin.

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In short, the Federal Government believes the USSR's objectives begin with Berlin, but go far beyond it. The Germans see that the effort to split the Western Alliance militarily and to gain large potential economic increments to Soviet power is linked to important local objectives in Berlin and East Germany by Soviet "break through" tactics. Any gains will be exploited as rapidly as possible, commensurate with Soviet estimates of Western reactions. The Soviet appetite is insatiable. But they will avoid war to gain Soviet objectives since war would threaten internal Soviet and bloc security.

There has been no essential change in the German estimate of Soviet objectives or tactics since November 1958 when the Soviets launched their current offensive.

The German estimate of the timing of Soviet moves encompasses a variety of factors: growing Soviet military strength (missiles, nuclear warheads), increased confidence of Soviet leaders in their relative power position, the dynamism of communist philosophy and *Weltanschauung*, real (but unwarranted) psychological fear of the Germans coupled with dread of the German-American combination in military matters, concern over potential German influence on Soviet satellites, especially Poland, and Soviet domestic matters (Khrushchev's prestige, economic plans, etc.). The German Government has been most impressed with Khrushchev's display of confidence. This has produced the opinion that it will be very difficult to gain Western objectives and that the West should seek to buy time.

B. German objectives and the status quo

1. Reunification.

Because of the unnatural division of Germany into four parts (Eastern territories, Soviet Zone of Germany, Berlin, and West Germany), and the strong, though fluctuating, German sentiment to reunify the country, all German political groups give top priority to reunification in stating their long range objectives. Even the Communists are for it, albeit for their own form and structure of a reunified Germany. Therefore, over the long term, Germany finds the status quo unacceptable. The Germans put the blame for the continued division of Germany on the USSR. The Americans are considered most eager to help achieve reunification.

There are a melange of reasons to support and reinforce the popular desire for reunification. Many of them are basic, human motivations not unique in Germany such as the desire to have families reunited, fondness of home and birthplace, prestige, economic factors and the like. Others have distinct German flavor, namely strong anti-Slav prejudices, a "perimeter mentality" which puts emphasis on a people within a clearly defined territory, and a particularly strong sense of orderly process which

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which includes right to one's homeland: (Recht auf Heimat) and the obligation to bring all Germans under one roof...

Consequently, it is impossible for any German government to denounce, or renounce reunification or to concur in any plan which terminates the hope and active search for reunification. Methods and time sequences for achieving it can vary and even be negotiated, but the principle cannot be denied. Therefore, the Federal Government will not formally accept the permanent division of Germany.

The Federal Government is ready and even eager to retain the current situation in Berlin which is characterized by de jure four power occupation, by de facto German administrations in East and West Berlin, and by ultimate Allied responsibility for security of the city. This status is acceptable, not as a permanent solution, but as a reasonable expedient for an interim period of undefined duration during which the Germans can hope and search for solutions to the reunification of the entire country.

It is not anomalous that the Federal Government supports prolongation of the occupation status of the US, UK, and France in Berlin. It has sound military, legal and political reasons. It recognizes Berlin's exposed military position. It is acutely aware that it cannot hold or defend West Berlin alone. It sees no good alternative legal position beyond occupation based on right of conquest which could be used to retain the presence of Western Allied troops in the city without sacrificing cardinal political policies. Among these policies are: the Federal Republic alone represents the German people and its corollary of non-recognition of the German Democratic Republic; the reunification of Germany by peaceful means with respect for the right of self determination and for freedom of foreign policy association; and the responsibility of the victor powers in World War II to sign a peace treaty with a united Germany.

The dangers and dilemmas in this policy framework are evident. Because of Berlin's position in the center of Soviet held territory, 110 miles from West Germany, access to West Berlin is vulnerable to Communist harassment. The Western Powers may be forced to choose between undesirable alternatives to maintain their presence in Berlin. To use force risks war. To deal with the East German regime risks its recognition; postpones, perhaps permanently, the reunification of Germany; and destroys almost all hope for an acceptable all-German peace treaty. To seek solution by negotiation raises to the maximum the quantity of the Soviet demands, especially in the security field.

2. Federal Government Views on German Security.

Both the German people and Chancellor Adenauer's Government have given priority to the security of the Federal Republic and Berlin over the reunification of Germany at this stage. The background for this position is:

- 1.) The firm belief that the USSR is an imminent threat to the existence of the Federal Republic or any independent German state;
- 2.) German dependence on other nations for protection against the USSR;
- 3.) Adenauer's desire and the Western Allied decision to restore West German sovereignty in the framework of European integration;
- 4.) The opposition of the USSR to reunification and the consequent German conclusion that it will be achievable only over the long term; and
- 5.) The decision to seek reunification only by peaceful means.

The Federal Government and the majority of the people who form its adherents and supporters believe that the Federal Republic is not and cannot be a first class power. Unless the Federal Republic is protected and integrated into the Western system, there will be no chance for reunification or a larger German role in Europe. The Federal Republic must be a part of a larger entity which will grow under the protection of the NATO "umbrella". Otherwise the USSR will gain control of all of Germany or the Federal Republic, alone, will be too weak to obtain reunification by any means. The first task is to assure the security of the Federal Republic. This requires American support, NATO membership and the development of West Germany's own forces.

Furthermore, the Federal Republic must be treated as an equal in NATO, in arming its own forces and in any disarmament scheme. This last point is currently used negatively, i.e., there should be no discrimination against the Federal Republic. It implies, however, the progressive relaxation of the WEU restrictions and limitations on German possession and manufacture of weapons. The Federal Republic has already begun to move to eliminate the limitations (anti tank, rocket and submarines).

C. External pressures on the Federal Republic

The external pressures which shape the contours and modify the implementation of the Federal Government's foreign policy are clearly evident in the Berlin and German crisis. The Federal Republic is not sovereign in matters affecting Germany as a whole and Berlin under the London and Paris Agreements of 1954. Her Western Allies on whom she depends for her own and Berlin's security, have individual national interests which are contradictory to reunification of Germany in varying degrees even though they are pledged to support it. There are those among Germany's neighbors and her associates who still harbor fears and resentments against Germany as a result of two World Wars, her rapid economic recovery, and her favorable competitive position in trade. Yet Germany's role in NATO defense plans has increased rapidly and, combined with her geographic position on the central front, make military control of her territory a glittering prize for the USSR or an indispensable link for NATO. Therefore, while Germany

may not be the cause of the East-West struggle; it is a vital factor in the strategy of the individual and collective powers in the opposing blocs. The Federal Government knows and must reckon with this fact of life in developing its own policy and position on individual issues.

1. Pressures from the Western Powers.

The Federal Government under the leadership of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer has pinned its hopes and tailored its policies to accord with those of the United States. There are two reasons for this: The US is the strongest of the Western Powers. The immediate and long range interests of the US are least in conflict with those of the Federal Government. Consequently, any sign of shift, no matter how slight or transitory, in US policy has a profound effect on the Federal Government. There are three cases in point: the anxiety caused by the Secretary's statements in November on the "agent theory" whereby East German officials would be unilaterally declared "agents" of the USSR should they assume control over Allied traffic to Berlin; the immediate reaction to the Secretary's remarks in January that free elections need not necessarily initiate the reunification process; and the wide speculation on the nature of American intent behind suggestions that the Germans themselves come up with counter proposals for fending off the Soviets in the current crisis. Consequently, for the Federal Government the most serious danger is the loss or potential loss of American support and protection. Any plan or proposal which would reduce American commitments, the presence of American forces or the possibility for bilateral German-American arrangements in the military or political spheres will be shoved under the rug by Chancellor Adenauer and his closest advisors.

The Federal Government must consider the interests of the UK and France most carefully and gingerly because it is now an "unequal equal" with them in world affairs. Essentially, the Federal Government tries not to offend these neighboring powers by avoiding sensitive points and by meeting them more than half way on others. A good example in the economic field is the careful though unsuccessful effort of the Federal Government to balance relations with the UK and France in the Common Market and Free Trade Area proposal. In the current crisis, the Federal Republic has not attempted to impose its will or to lead its Allies in a particular direction. Rather, Chancellor Adenauer has attempted to narrow the consideration of points (disengagement, recognition, and negotiations) and to convince M. de Gaulle and Mr. Macmillan that certain subjects should have lower or higher priority in discussions or negotiations with the USSR. Where he feared that subjects vital to Germany, particularly in the security field, are likely to be broached by the UK or France with the USSR, he has tried to delay or moderate the proposal or its effect. However, the Chancellor and his Government are vulnerable to British and French pressure in spite of careful tactics.

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The Chancellor must preserve a united Western front. If West Germany and Berlin are to be run through the Soviet gauntlet successfully, therefore, he must present unchallengeable arguments to his allies, win American support wherever possible, and never allow himself to become isolated or estranged from the UK and France. There are good indications that he is fully aware of this situation [as evidenced by his recent conversations with the British and French and discussions within his own circle of principal advisors on the possibility of granting de facto recognition to the German Democratic Republic under certain specific conditions which would protect Berlin and keep open hopes of reunification].

2. Pressures from the USSR.

In addition to the direct pressure of the Soviets on Berlin and Germany explicit in the Khrushchev gambit itself, the USSR has used several indirect methods which limit German responses and actions: the Soviet military threats against the Federal Republic's allies; massive Soviet support for the East German regime, both political and military; and the threat of a separate peace treaty with the East German regime. Soviet military threats and Soviet support for the GDR raise the danger of war and inhibit the Western Powers from united and forceful actions. The separate peace treaty tactic deepens the German dilemma over security versus reunification by threatening to make the division of Germany final and permanent.

Probably the most effective Soviet pressure of all is that being threatened, but not yet employed, against Allied access to Berlin. The vulnerable Allied communications lines not only are the arteries for Berlin's physical and economic security and well being, but they link the Berlin crisis with the German problem. In order to defend their position and rights in Berlin, without war, the Allies may be induced to sacrifice German hopes for reunification by recognizing the East German regime or even to make military security concessions in Germany which the Soviets ardently desire.

D. The domestic German situation.

The eruption of the Berlin and German crisis in November 1958 startled the West German Government. It put nearly all of its political leaders in a dilemma and subjected basic German policy areas and positions, both in the governing and opposition parties, to severe strains.

While the cause of this pressure has been merely Soviet notes and statements and nothing has actually transpired, at least overtly, the severity of the pressure lies in the nature of the German problem and the force of divergent pulls of great political and psychological magnitude on individual Germans and groups of Germans. For the Federal Government and the political leaders of all the moderate parties, the imminent convergence of security, reunification, and Berlin problems presents a crisis of unparalleled

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severity rending fundamental German drives askew.

The obvious responses to bewildering alternatives are: to oppose any changes and thus to avoid the issues and to leave the decision to leaders or even to other nations and thus avoid responsibility. This was in fact the initial response to the newest Soviet challenge and it is still the strongest characteristic of German public attitudes.

For German leaders and the German Government, however, it has not been easy to escape the burdens. [Between Allied insistence that the Germans themselves produce suggested solutions and counter proposals (since the "problem is primarily a German one") and German concern that if they themselves did not come up with proposals, their Allies might surrender or negotiate away basic German interests plus the awareness that their adherents and fellow citizens were looking to them to find "a solution without war," each German leader has felt compelled to produce a plan. The multiplicity and intensity of effort has been staggering. The results have been disappointing.] To rationalize German concern for security, reunification, and Berlin in a single package which will receive the approval of the Allies and the German people and still be negotiable and acceptable to the USSR is well nigh impossible.

In these circumstances, the relative degree of cohesion and lack of partisan recrimination among and within the Government, the Foreign Office, the Bundestag and the political parties has been remarkable, although there have been fluctuations in the last six months. The principal political parties, the Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democratic Party, moved closer together in November. There was even scattered talk, but not earnest consideration, of the need for a government coalition of the CDU and SPD. Then, however, old divergencies flared up in their traditional and pre-November form over the Socialists's German Plan of March 19. As before, the essential difference between the majority elements of two parties lies in the complex security problem. The SPD believes that the military status of Germany and an agreed security situation in central Europe must be achieved between the Western Allies and the USSR before the reunification and Berlin problems can be successfully approached. The CDU and the Federal Government maintain that the security of the Federal Republic must be safeguarded under all circumstances. They believe that to make security concessions in advance to the USSR before an agreed and guaranteed political solution is reached and inaugurated, would be equivalent to national suicide.

The renewed heat of party strife and the hard Soviet line opposing reunification and pressing for a peace treaty may have a salutary effect temporarily in annealing distinct cracks which appeared in the SPD and in the CDU itself in March and April. The latter is a conglomerate party containing more than a few dissident elements and individuals who are difficult to keep in line with party positions even in good times. There may also be

